Publications
Books
- The Bounds of Possibility: Puzzles of Modal Variation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2021 (with Cian Dorr and John Hawthorne). Ca. 460 pp.
- Narrow Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018 (with John Hawthorne). 213 pp.
- Review by David Chalmers in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
- Review by Sarah Sawyer in Mind
- Review by Anandi Hattiangadi in Analysis
- Comment by Alex Byrne in Philosophical Studies
- Comment by Paul Pietroski in Philosophical Studies
- Comment by Jeff Speaks in Philosophical Studies
- Comment by Sarah Sawyer in Inquiry
- Williamson on Modality. London: Routledge, 2017 (edited, with Mark McCullagh). 406 pp.
- Review by Lev Lamberov in Философия науки (Philosophy of Science), 77 (2018), pp. 158-171 (in Russian)
Articles
- “Intensionalism and Propositional Attitudes”, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind (with John Hawthorne)
- “Counterpart Theory and Counterfactuals”, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (with John Hawthorne)
- “Challenges for an Experimentalist’s Skepticism about Cases”, in D. Prelevic and A. Vaidya, eds., The Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Thinking. London: Routledge, forthcoming (with Margot Strohminger).
- “Précis of Narrow Content”, Philosophical Studies, published online 25 September 2020 (with John Hawthorne)
- “Reply to Byrne”, Philosophical Studies, published online 23 September 2020 (with John Hawthorne)
- “Reply to Pietroski”, Philosophical Studies, published online 24 September 2020 (with John Hawthorne)
- “Reply to Speaks”, Philosophical Studies, published online 24 September 2020 (with John Hawthorne)
- “Reply to Mendelovici and Bourget”, forthcoming in Inquiry (with John Hawthorne)
- “Reply to Sawyer”, Inquiry, published online 25 October 2020 (with John Hawthorne)
- “Kas tähendus on suvaline?” [“Is Meaning Arbitrary?”], forthcoming in Akadeemia. Translated into Estonian by Henrik Sova.
- “Modal Epistemology”, in John Hawthorne, Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming (with John Hawthorne) [Draft at Academia.edu]
- “Knowledge of Objective Modality”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 176 (2019), pp. 1155–1175 (with Margot Strohminger). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
- “Operator Arguments Revisited”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 176, (2019), pp. 2933–2959 (with John Hawthorne and Peter Fritz) [Draft at Academia.edu | PhilPapers]
- “The Necessity of Mathematics”, Noûs, published online-first, 18 September 2018 (with John Hawthorne) [Draft at Academia.edu | PhilPapers]
- “Moderate Modal Skepticism”, in M. Benton, J. Hawthorne, and D. Rabinowitz, eds., Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 302-321 (with Margot Strohminger). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
- “Semantic Externalism without Thought Experiments”, Analysis, Vol. 78 (2018), pp. 81–89 [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.] Related:
- A reply by Sarah Sawyer, Analysis, Vol. 78 (2018), pp. 675–681
- A reply by Michael Rieppel, Analysis, Vol. 79 (2019), pp. 470-447
- A reply by Casey Woodling, Philosophia, published online-first, 17 July 2019
- “The Epistemology of Modality”, Analysis, Vol. 77 (2017), pp. 825-838 (with Margot Strohminger). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers]
- “Vagueness and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 30 (2016), pp. 229–269 (with Jon Litland). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
- “Epistemicism and Modality”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 803–835. [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.] Related:
- Appendix by Peter Fritz, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 836–838.
- A Reply by Timothy Williamson, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 839-851.
- “Propositions and Compositionality”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 27 (2013), pp. 526-563. [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
- “Modal Skepticism and Counterfactual Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 162 (2013), pp. 605–623 [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
- “Habitual and Conditional Analyses of Disposition Ascriptions”, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 240 (2010), pp. 664-670. [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
- “Causal and Explanatory Autonomy: Comments on Menzies and List”. In G. Macdonald and C. Macdonald, eds., Emergence in Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 129-138 (with Ausonio Marras). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
- “Reference and Extension”. In P. C. Hogan, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 705-707 (with James McGilvray).
- “The Supervenience Argument”. In S. Gozzano and F. Orilia, eds., Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2008, pp. 101-132 (with Ausonio Marras). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
Work in Progress
Books
- Vagueness and Ignorance (with John Hawthorne)
Articles
- “Being in a Position to Know” (with John Hawthorne)
- “Higher-Order Logic as Metaphysics” (with Zachary Goodsell)
- “Rigid Designation”
- “Propositional Attitudes” (with John Hawthorne)
- “Structural Unknowability” (with John Hawthorne)
- “Counterpart Theory and Modal Logic” [Draft at Academia.edu]
- “Rigidity and limits of stipulation“
- “Purely Logical Opacity”