Selected Publications

Books

• The Bounds of Possibility: Puzzles of Modal Variation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021 (with Cian Dorr and John Hawthorne). x + 436 pages.
  • Review by Timothy Williamson in Analysis
• Narrow Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018 (with John Hawthorne). 213 pages.
  • Review by David Chalmers in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
  • Review by Ethan Jerzak in Philosophical Review
  • Review by Sarah Sawyer in Mind​
  • Review by Anandi Hattiangadi in Analysis
  • Reply by Frank Jackson and Daniel Stoljar in Philosophical Studies
  • Comment by Alex Byrne in Philosophical Studies
  • Comment by Paul Pietroski in Philosophical Studies
  • Comment by Jeff Speaks in Philosophical Studies
  • Comment by Sarah Sawyer in Inquiry
  • Reply by Ori Simchen in Analytic Philosophy
• Williamson on Modality. London: Routledge, 2017 (edited, with Mark McCullagh). 406 pp.
  • Review by Lev Lamberov in Философия науки (Philosophy of Science), 77 (2018), pp. 158-171 (in Russian)

Articles

• “Intensionalism and Propositional Attitudes”, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind (with John Hawthorne)
• “Counterpart Theory and Counterfactuals”, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (with John Hawthorne)
• “Being in a Position to Know”, Philosophical Studies, published online 30 August 2021 (with John Hawthorne)
• “Précis of Narrow Content”, Philosophical Studies​, published online 25 September 2020 (with John Hawthorne)
• “Reply to Byrne”, Philosophical Studies, published online 23 September 2020​ (with John Hawthorne)
• “Reply to Pietroski”, Philosophical Studies​, published online 24 September 2020 (with John Hawthorne)
• “Reply to Speaks”, Philosophical Studies, published online 24 September 2020​ (with John Hawthorne)
• “Reply to Bourget and Mendelovici”, Inquiry​, published online 16 November 2022 (with John Hawthorne)
• “Reply to Sawyer”, Inquiry​, published online 25 October 2020 (with John Hawthorne)​​
• “Operator Arguments Revisited”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 176, (2019), pp. 2933–2959 (with John Hawthorne and Peter Fritz)
• “The Necessity of Mathematics”, Noûs​, published online-first, 18 September 2018 (with John Hawthorne)
• “Semantic Externalism without Thought Experiments”, Analysis, Vol. 78 (2018), pp. 81–89.
  • A reply by ​Sarah Sawyer, Analysis, Vol. 78 (2018), pp. 675–681.
  • A reply by Michael Rieppel, Analysis, Vol. 79 (2019), pp. 470-447.
  • A reply by Casey Woodling, Philosophia, published online-first, 17 July 2019.
• “Vagueness and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 30 (2016), pp. 229–269  (with Jon Litland).
• “Epistemicism and Modality”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 803–835.
  • ​Appendix by Peter Fritz, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 836–838.
  • A Reply by Timothy Williamson, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 839-851.
• “Propositions and Compositionality”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 27 (2013), pp. 526-563.​

​​Work in Progress

Book

• Logical Foundations (with Zachary Goodsell). This book introduces and motivates LF, a new system of logic, through its applications in mathematics, syntax (including the theory of computability and metatheory), and semantics.

Advance praise for Logical Foundations

"Recent work by Goodsell and Yli-Vakkuri [in Logical Foundations] [...] indicates that systems like [The Bounds of Possibility]’s are too weak for mathematical purposes, because they lack an adequate comprehension principle for functions. Goodsell and Yli-Vakkuri’s own system LF of higher-order logic has such a principle, as a corollary of an axiom of choice. Although LF individuates functions extensionally, it is not extensional, for it implies that some materially equivalent propositions are distinct. LF is intensional; whenever a biconditional is provable, so is the corresponding propositional identity. They show LF to suffice for most of contemporary mathematics: a new version of logicism. My money has always been on mathematical power to beat metaphysical qualms, not least in higher-order modal logic [...]. LF incorporates modality by identifying necessity with being identical to the weakest truth. They derive the strong modal logic S5, the necessity of identity and distinctness, and the Barcan formula and its converse. Mathematical strength and modal strength go naturally together.”
Timothy Williamson, University of Oxford

Articles

• “Defining Meaning” (with Zachary Goodsell)
• “Rigid Designation”
• “Structural Unknowability” (with John Hawthorne)
• ​“Counterpart Theory and Modal Logic” [no longer in progress; draft at Academia.edu]​​