Publications and Manuscripts

Books

• Narrow Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018 (with John Hawthorne). 213 pp.
• Williamson on Modality. London: Routledge, 2017 (edited, with Mark McCullagh). 406 pp.

Articles

• “Modal Epistemology“, in John Hawthorne, ​Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming (with John Hawthorne) [Draft at Academia.edu]
• “Knowledge of Objective Modality”, Philosophical Studies, published online-first, 28 February 2018 ​(with Margot Strohminger). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
• “Moderate Modal Skepticism”, in M. Benton, J. Hawthorne, and D. Rabinowitz, eds., Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 302-321 (with Margot Strohminger). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
• “Semantic Externalism without Thought Experiments”, Analysis, Vol. 78 (2018), pp. 81–89 [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.] Related:
  • ​Sarah Sawyer, “Is there a deductive argument for semantic externalism? Reply to Yli-Vakkuri”, Analysis, Vol. 78 (2018), published online-first.
• “The Epistemology of Modality", Analysis, Vol. 77 (2017), pp. 825-838 (with Margot Strohminger). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers]
• “Vagueness and Modality", Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 30 (2016), pp. 229–269  (with Jon Litland).  [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
• “Epistemicism and Modality”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 803–835. [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.] Related:
  • ​Appendix by Peter Fritz, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 836–838.
  • Timothy Williamson, “Reply to Yli-Vakkuri”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 839-851.
• “Propositions and Compositionality”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 27 (2013), pp. 526-563.  [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
• “Modal Skepticism and Counterfactual Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 162 (2013), pp. 605–623  [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
• “Habitual and Conditional Analyses of Disposition Ascriptions”, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 240 (2010), pp. 664-670. [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
• “Causal and Explanatory Autonomy: Comments on Menzies and List”. In G. Macdonald and C. Macdonald, eds., Emergence in Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 129-138 (with Ausonio Marras). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]
• “The Supervenience Argument”. In S. Gozzano and F. Orilia, eds., Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2008, pp. 101-132 (with Ausonio Marras). [Archived at Academia.edu | PhilPapers.]

Contributions to Reference Works

• “Externalism about Mental Content”. Forthcoming in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (This article will replace the current one by Max Deutsch and Joe Lau.)
• “Reference and Extension”. In P. C. Hogan, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 705-707 (with James McGilvray). 

​Work in Progress

• Vagueness and Ignorance (a monograph with John Hawthorne)
• “The Necessity of Mathematics” (with John Hawthorne) [Draft at Academia.edu]
• “Operator Arguments Revisited” (with John Hawthorne and Peter Fritz) [Draft at Academia.edu | PhilPapers]​
• “On a Priori Knowledge of Necessity” (with Margot Strohminger) [Draft at Academia.edu | PhilPapers]
• “Imaginative Resistance and Truth in Fiction” (with Margot Strohminger)
• “The New Chisholm Paradox” (with John Hawthorne)
• “L'arbitraire du Signe: Higher-Order Modal Logic Meets Semiotics”
• “Natural Language Modals Are Ambiguous”
• “Rigidity and limits of stipulation“
• “Purely Logical Opacity”
• “Abductive Millianism”
• “A Counterfactual Analysis of Truth in Fiction”
• “What is a Circumstance of Evaluation?”
• “Self-Verifying Sentences and Truth in a Context“
• “The Logic and Semantics of Non-Uniformity“​
• “A Puzzle about Self-Verifying Belief”
• “Knowing What It's Like”