Publications

Books

• The Bounds of Possibility: Puzzles of Modal Variation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021 (with Cian Dorr and John Hawthorne). 464 pages.
• Narrow Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018 (with John Hawthorne). 213 pages.
  • Review by David Chalmers in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
  • Review by Sarah Sawyer in Mind​
  • Review by Anandi Hattiangadi in Analysis
  • Reply by Frank Jackson and Daniel Stoljar in Philosophical Studies
  • Comment by Alex Byrne in Philosophical Studies
  • Comment by Paul Pietroski in Philosophical Studies
  • Comment by Jeff Speaks in Philosophical Studies
  • Comment by Sarah Sawyer in Inquiry
  • Reply by Ori Simchen in Analytic Philosophy
• Williamson on Modality. London: Routledge, 2017 (edited, with Mark McCullagh). 406 pp.
  • Review by Lev Lamberov in Философия науки (Philosophy of Science), 77 (2018), pp. 158-171 (in Russian)

Articles

• Intensionalism and Propositional Attitudes”, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind (with John Hawthorne)
• “Counterpart Theory and Counterfactuals”, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (with John Hawthorne)
• “Challenges for an Experimentalist’s Skepticism about Cases”, in D. Prelevic and A. Vaidya, eds., The Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Thinking. London: Routledge, forthcoming  ​(with Margot Strohminger). 
• “Being in a Position to Know”, Philosophical Studies, published online 30 August 2021 (with John Hawthorne)
• “Précis of Narrow Content”, Philosophical Studies​, published online 25 September 2020 (with John Hawthorne)
• “Reply to Byrne”, Philosophical Studies, published online 23 September 2020​ (with John Hawthorne)
• “Reply to Pietroski”, Philosophical Studies​, published online 24 September 2020 (with John Hawthorne)
• “Reply to Speaks”, Philosophical Studies, published online 24 September 2020​ (with John Hawthorne)
• “Reply to Mendelovici and Bourget”, forthcoming in Inquiry​ (with John Hawthorne)
• “Reply to Sawyer”, Inquiry​, published online 25 October 2020 (with John Hawthorne)​
• “Knowledge of Objective Modality”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 176 (2019), pp. 1155–1175 ​(with Margot Strohminger)
• “Operator Arguments Revisited”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 176, (2019), pp. 2933–2959 (with John Hawthorne and Peter Fritz)
• “The Necessity of Mathematics”, Noûs​, published online-first, 18 September 2018 (with John Hawthorne)
• “Moderate Modal Skepticism”, in M. Benton, J. Hawthorne, and D. Rabinowitz, eds., Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 302-321 (with Margot Strohminger).
• “Semantic Externalism without Thought Experiments”, Analysis, Vol. 78 (2018), pp. 81–89.
  • A reply by ​Sarah Sawyer, Analysis, Vol. 78 (2018), pp. 675–681.
  • A reply by Michael Rieppel, Analysis, Vol. 79 (2019), pp. 470-447.
  • A reply by Casey Woodling, Philosophia, published online-first, 17 July 2019.
• “The Epistemology of Modality”, Analysis, Vol. 77 (2017), pp. 825-838 (with Margot Strohminger).
• “Vagueness and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 30 (2016), pp. 229–269  (with Jon Litland).
• “Epistemicism and Modality”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 803–835.
  • ​Appendix by Peter Fritz, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 836–838.
  • A Reply by Timothy Williamson, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, Nos. 4-5 (2016), pp. 839-851.
• “Propositions and Compositionality”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 27 (2013), pp. 526-563.
• “Modal Skepticism and Counterfactual Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 162 (2013), pp. 605–623.
• “Habitual and Conditional Analyses of Disposition Ascriptions”, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 240 (2010), pp. 664-670.
• “Causal and Explanatory Autonomy: Comments on Menzies and List”. In G. Macdonald and C. Macdonald, eds., Emergence in Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 129-138 (with Ausonio Marras).
• “Reference and Extension”. In P. C. Hogan, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 705-707 (with James McGilvray). 
• “The Supervenience Argument”. In S. Gozzano and F. Orilia, eds., Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2008, pp. 101-132 (with Ausonio Marras).

​​Work in Progress

Books

• Logical Foundations of Philosophy (with Zachary Goodsell)
  
• Vagueness and Ignorance (with John Hawthorne)

Articles

• “Defining Meaning” (with Zachary Goodsell)
• “Rigid Designation”
• “Structural Unknowability” (with John Hawthorne)
• ​“Counterpart Theory and Modal Logic” [Draft at Academia.edu]​​